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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEROLD L. DAVIS dba 
JERRY DAVIS AND ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, 
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, SANDRA H. FLINDERS, 
KATHRYN B. HEATH, DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY, 
BONNIE J. BRINTON, HELEN YOUNG, MARY FRANCIS 
BENNION, LAWRENCE T. HEATH, CAROLYN H. MARLER, 
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Case No. 14549 
MOTION FOR 
RE-HEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a motion for rehearing in the above entitled 
action reversing the decision of the lower Court in favor of the 
defendant and appellant and against plaintiff and respondent and 
cross-complainants and respondents. 
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DISPOSITION 
This Court on December 22, 1976, in a unanimous opinion, 
reversed the holding of the District Court and dismissed plain-
tiff's complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS A PROPER ACCEPTANCE. 
As to the statement in the opinion that there never was 
a proper acceptance of the earnest money agreement we respectfully 
submit the following: 
This was a small family corporation in which all of the 
transactions for many years had been done in an informal manner 
and without strict compliance with the statute upon which the Cour 
relies in its ruling. To hold a familylike corporation such as 
the Heath Development Company must comply literally with the pro-
visions of Sec. 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated as amended, would 
result in declaring void practically every act of the corporation 
for years. The record certainly shows that all the stockholders 
agreed to the sale and were anxious that it be consummated and 
gave the purchasers until May 1, 1974 in which to secure financin 
Even the listing agreement entered into on November 13, 
1973, was authorized by the President without complying with the 
statutes and NO evidence of any statutory notice for the share-
holders meeting held in November at the suggestion of the plainti 
is indicated, nor was any objection by any stockholder ever 
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raised. 
The signing of the name of the three absent shareholders 
by their relatives has not been objected to by the defendant or any 
individual shareholder or by this Honorable Court. 
Many Utah cases recognize the validity of courses of con-
duct by small family type corporations where the stock is closely 
held that does not meet the rigid rules tor large corporations. Th 
statement that the earnest money agreement entered into for the sal 
was void, we believe to be inaccurate, possibly voidable but not vo 
This Honorable Court held on a number of occasions in sub-
stance that where a party deals with a corporation in good faith he 
is not affected by the fact that proper steps were not taken to 
clothe the corporate officer with such authority. 
In Peterson vs. Holmgren Land & Livestock Co., 12 Utah 2d 
125 363 P.2d 786, Wade, J: stated at pagefe 130-31: 
"If a corporate officer assuming to contract on 
behalf of the corporation is one to whom authority to 
make such a contract may be given, a person dealing with 
him in good faith is not affected by the fact that the 
proper steps to clothe him with ifhcit authority were not 
taken. 
* * * * 
"Without belaboring the record any further, it is 
sufficient to say ttfet there was nothing illegal or in-
equitable about the transaction ^hen it was entered into 
by the parties' thereto. Both parfties had equal knowledge 
of all the facts and were motivated by a desire to arrange 
boundary lines so that each woulc^  benefit and there would 
be no interference with each other in their resoective 
projects." 
-3-
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Again in Shaw vs. Bailey-McCune Company, et al., 11 Utah 
2d 93, 355 P.2d 321, Callister, J. stated at page 95: 
"Under some circumstances the corporate entity may 
be disregarded in the intent of justice in such 
cases as fraud, contravention of law or contract, 
or public wrong. * * * 
"Moreover, the conditions under which the cor-
porate entity may be disregarded or the corporation 
be regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders 
vary according to the circumstances in each case in-
asmuch as the doctrine is essentially an equitable 
one and for that reason is particularly within the 
province of the trial court." 
The particular circumstanced in this case we submit was 
the informality of the family corporate meetings. 
In Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 598, Faux, 
D.J. stated at page 445. 
"So we have the owners of substantially all of 
the stock of the corporation, who were also the owners 
of the land before it came into the corporation as its 
primary asset, acting without the formality of a stock-
holders meeting or a written resolution in selling the 
primary asset of the corporation. More, they agreed in 
the name of the corporation, as part of the sale that all 
payments should go from the buyers to Mr. and Mrs. Grover 
individually and to turn over to the Garns property of 
Mr. Grover consisting of shares of water stock and 
rights for grazing cattle under the U.S. Taylor Grazing 
Act. While this latter facet of the whole contract may 
be termed a maverick and concededly not a model for all 
corporate dealings yet as tendered in defense by the 
Garn defendants and respondents we are not concerned 
here with a corporation having a multitude of stockhold-
ers situated over a wide expanse of the country. The 
two owners signed as vice president and secretary-treas-
urer of seller corporation on October 1, 1964. While 
we do not approve the method employed here and certainly 
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denounce it as a pattern to be followed by corpora-
tions generally, we cannot disagree in this instance 
with the statement of law: 
"'* * * * but the trend of authority is to uphold 
as binding on the corporations acts or contracts on 
its behalf by a person or persons owning all or prac-
tically all the stock." 
This case therefore held in substance that a contract 
for the sale of a dry farm executed by the owners of substan-
tially all of the stock of the corporation is binding upon the 
corporation notwithstanding the fact that the sellers had not 
complied with the procedure set forth in 16-10-74 Utah Code Anno-
tated as amended. 
We submit that this is in all respects identical to the 
one at bar, it being a small family corporation in which the 
stockholders and officers operated in the manner of a partnership 
rather than the formality of a large corporation. One of the prin-
cipal objectives, if not the principal objective, of this corpora-
tion, has been to sell the trailer court and distribute the money. 
The operation of the trailer court has been continued only be-
cause they could not find a buyer. The plaintiff and respondent 
produced a buyer and then made it possible for the buyer to make 
a cash deal. 
POINT II. 
THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT VOID BUT VOIDABLE 
Plaintiff and respondent secured a purchaser for the 
property and the offer to purchase presented January 13th was 
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within the 90 day listing period agreement signed November 13th. 
The offer was presented to all qualified directors, and accepted 
by all. The four owned over 80% of the voting stock. If they 
approved as stockholders, another meeting would be superfluous. 
This contract was not void but at best only voidable. The plain-
tiff and respondent suggested a five day period to reconsider. 
No attempt to disaffirm this contract was taken by de-
fendant until after the 90 day listing contract expired. 
To permit the defendant corporation to treat the contract 
as valid, which it can^^t do until after the listing period expire; 
and then exercise their voidable option, creates a loop hole that 
will enable a defendant to do a real estate concern out of its com 
mission at will. 
The facts are that the defendant treated the contract as 
binding for not only the balance of the listing period, thereby 
preventing the plaintiff from presenting any other offer to pur-
chase during a substantial part of the listing period, but also 
continued to treat the contract as binding until April 8, 1974 
when the plaintiff was devoting his time in securing financing to 
comply with the purchase agreement to pay cash in full. 
To hold a family type corporation such as the Heath 
Development Company must comply literally with the provisions 
of Section 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated as amended, would re-
sult in declaring invalid practically every act of the corpora-
tion for years. 
Defendants had ample opportunity to disclaim or to 
rescind the actions of the corporation taken on January 13, 1974, 
but instead chose to deprive the plaintiff and respondent of one-
third of the listing period in which he well might have found 
another buyer and let plaintiff and his a^lociates continue their 
efforts to finance the sale. The testimony of Mrs. Heath was in 
substance that she changed her mind about signing the deed with-
out further consultation or a meeting with the stockholders, but 
only upon the advise of a husband of on^ of the minority stock-
Uwfcl 
holders (one Flinders). £t that time no question of the validity 
of the sale had arisen by anyone of the members of this family 
corporation. It was only then that the president of the defendant 
corporation suddenly became hesitant. 
We would again like to call to this Court's attention 
the recent case of Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 28 Utah 
2d 61, 503 P.2d 510, and the language therein used by Mr. Justice 
Ellett at page 363: 
"Where, as in the execution of the trust deed 
here under consideration, there is an entire absence of a 
want of good faith, fraud and cpllusion, and the corpor-
ation is yet a going concern, no sound principal of law 
prohibits a stockholder or director from dealing with the 
corporation. A corporation is an artificial entity, and 
one of the principal objects of its creation is to contrac 
with individuals in du«r course of business. This it may 
do with its directors and stockholders as well as with 
others; and under the weight of American authority at 
least, contracts made by the corporation with its officers 
are not void per se, but at most voidable merely at the 
election of the corporation or its representatives, within 
a reasonable time. 
"In the instant matter the transaction between 
Heaps and his corporation occurred September 3, 1963. 
Neither the corporation or any (stockholder or creditor 
thereof ever complained about the deal. The cor-
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poration collected the rentals until January, 1968, 
when it filed its petition in bankruptcy. 
"The trial court found on sufficient evidence before 
it that 'the transaction between the cross-defendants, 
Arnell E. Heaps and Western National Investment, Inc., 
was in good faith and for a fair and adequate con-
sideration. ' 
11
 An appellate court should not reverse a trial 
court when the evidence is such as to sustain the find-
ings made and the judgment rendered is based upon the 
facts found and in accordance with the law of the case. 
The judgment is affirmed with costs to respondent." 
Judge Ellett quotes from the language of Singer vs. Salt 
Lake Copper Manufacturing Co., 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024, a very 
early case (1889). 
"Where there is an entire absence of a want of good 
faith, fraud, and collusion, and the corporation is yet 
a going concern, no sound principle of law prohibits a 
stockholder or director from dealing with the corpora-
tion. Contracts made by the corporation with its 
officers are not void per se; but such contracts will 
be carefully scrutinized in equity, and will be set 
aside if not made in the utmost good faith." 
In 19 Am. Jur.2d §1281 p. 689, we find the following: 
"While occupying such a fiduciary relation, the 
officers and directors of a corporation are precluded 
from receiving any personal advantage without the fullest 
disclosure to, and assent of, all concerned. However, a 
corporation is entitled to repudiate a transaction made by 
directors for their own benefit must act promptly on know-
ledge of the facts and cannot wait and speculate upon the 
chances of delay. Also, the fiduciary duties of directors 
as such do not preclude the stockholders, as parties con-
tracting by a bylaw unanimously adopted and agreed to, from 
ing in the directors a discretion which might be excused 
in their personal favor." 
If the earnest money receipt is only vodable, then the act 
must occur within a reasonable time, and certainly before sub-
stantial rights or obligations have been created or terminated 
because of the failure of ..the corporation to act in a responsible 
manner. 
Conflict of interest we believe to be an interest that 
is adverse to the corporation• In this case, all four of the 
qualified directors had substantially equal adverse interest 
as far as the corporation was concerned* They wanted to liqui-
date the corporation and had been trying to do so for years. 
All four,and particularly the president, Katherine 
Heath and her sister, Essie Heath, because they were anxious to 
liquidate the corporation and receive their share of the money 
so they could enjoy it while they were still alive. None of the 
smaller stockholders who were all made defendants, originally 
challenged the transaction as a stockholder. All of the stock-
holders were aware of the terms of sale all along and if any 
claim otherwise, they certainly were aware when they were served 
with summons in the personal capacity. None objected as stock-
holders. The conduct of the plaintiff was certainly above re-
proach and considerable time was spent in the explaining not only 
to the directors, but to other stockholders as to the amount of 
money each would receive. 
POINT III. 
ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff further submits that the defendants are estoppec 
from claiming any irregularity in the manner in which the sale 
was made. 
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In the case of Grover v. Garn, which we have heretofore 
cited, 23 Utah 2d 441, the Court held that "under the doctrine 
or principle of estoppel in pais one may by his acts or conduct 
away from the court prevent himself from denying in court the 
effect or result of those acts." We respect a definition of long 
standing taken from Black's Law Dictionary: 
"An estoppel by the conduct or admissions of a party 
* * * it is, and always was, a familiar principal in 
the law of contracts. It lies at the foundation of mor-
als and is a cardinal point in the exposition of prom-
ises, that one shall be bound by the state of facts which 
he has induced another to act upon. 
"The trial court ruled that Mr. and Mrs. Grover 
by their acts and statements led the Garns to believe 
that they had authority to sell the farm. We fail to 
find evidence in the record that compels us to reverse 
that ruling." 
We submit the following cases on the subject of estoppel: 
"Where all the officers of a corporation parti-
cipate without dissent in an informal meeting there-
of, and thereafter execute an agreement entered into 
at such meeting, they are estopped to deny the 
legality of the meeting. Kearneysville Creamery 
Co. v. American Creamery Co., 51 ALR 938, 103 
W Va 259. 137 SE 217." 
MThe disregard for over twenty years by the stock-
holders of a business corporation of bylaws governing 
the sale and transfer of stockcf the corporation and 
giving stockholders the right to participate in the 
purchase of stock before any sale thereof by a stock-
holder, and the failure of the stockholders to object 
to any transfer or .sale although the bylaws had not 
been complied with in any of the several sales and 
transfers during such period amounts to a waiver of 
such bylaws and precludes the stockholders from 
asserting the bylaws as a ground for setting aside 
a purchase of stock, although another bylaw provides 
the manner of amending or modifying the bylaws. 
Elliott v. Lindquist, 169 ALR 1369, 356 pa 385, 52 
A2d 180. 
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SUMMARY 
The otter and acceptance placed another obligation on 
the plaintiff. To find some means to enable the purchaser to com-
ply with the provisions ot tne agreement to sell. The sellers had 
been told to taKe time to consider the ciffer, be sure they wanted 
to sell on the terms presented. 
The balance of the listing period expired and the plaintiff 
continued his efforts to find financing for the purchaser. Testimon 
in the record indicates the plaintiff did find the financing; this 
was one of the conditions of the agreement to sell. Only then did 
the same persons who agreed to sell make the decision not to sell. 
The court's opinion dismisses this by cohcluding the first agreement 
meant nothing. The trial court in listening to all the witnesses 
concluded Katherine Heath, as the president, or as a director, or 
as an individual could not do this. She had used her position as 
president, as director and as a stockholder to enter into the agree-
ment and had remained quiet for this long period of time and now 
after the plaintiff had fully performed, she shouldnot he allowed 
to disavow the prior contract and agreement with impunity. This may 
be called estoppel, but by whatever name, to permit this to be done 
with impunity is not justice but injustice; to require the transac-
tion involved in this case to be approved by a majority of a disin-
terested board of directors is not possible, as there are only four 
directors and if two are purchasers the transaction cannot be made. 
This seems like an undesirable result and one the Court, would hot 
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wish to establish. 
Sandra Flinders had never met the requirements stated in 
the Articles of Incorporation to become a director. To require 
an illegal or unqualified director as a necessary party to approve 
what the Court has otherwise designated as a void or illegal contra« 
does not sound like good law. We must either assume the President 
had the power to approve the sale which is evident she did, or we 
must consider the sales agreement as being approved with over 80% 
of the stockholders . To go out of ones way to find a contract not 
binding and thereby establish a questionable principal, is also in 
conflict with case law of this State. (See Grover vs. Garn); to loo 
at the facts with the view toward justice and integrity and hold pe 
to their obvious intentions when it can be done with more attention 
to reality than to obstruct the obvious intent by looking for techr 
cal means to obstruct justice. 
There was no directors1 meeting called to authorize the 
listing agreement and the manner of calling the stockholders1 meet-
ing did not meet the statutory provisions and the signing of the n< 
of three stockholders who were not present by other members of 
the family simply illustrates the informality with which the affai: 
of the corporation were conducted. Examination of the offer to 
purchase and its acceptance shows it was signed by stockholders 
owning over 80% of the corporation stock. These individuals signe 
cr 
as individuals, as stockholder, *•* as directors. From the docume 
neither of those positions are plausible. One thing is abundantly 
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clear. They all intended to sell the property. They thought they 
had the authority to do what they were Jdoing. The questions at th 
meetings explaining how much money each one would share personally 
Everyone was to be paid out of the purchase price. At the time thi 
offer was accepted, the plaintifffs listing agreement had another 
30 days to run. The opinion of this Court seems to disregard that 
fact. On January 13, 1974, when defendant co<rporation, through it. 
stockholders meeting accepted the offer, plaintifffs listing agree-
ment had 30 days more to run. 
The plaintiff1s claim is generally disposed of by assump-
tions that are not in keeping with the facts of the case. 
This plaintiff developed and presented an offer to purchai 
the property. There is no conflict in this statement as to the ac-
tual facts and the findings of the trial court. If the plaintiff 
was sufficiently alert and reasonably successful to find a purchase 
that defendants should have found, but did not, that fact in itseli 
certainly should not detract from the credit due to the salesman. 
The Heath Development Corporation had, over a number of 
years, as its primary objective - the sale of the trailer court -
to distribute the money, and dissolve th[e corporation. The continue 
operation of the trailer court was an activity tolerated only becai: 
and until a sale could be made. To hole} the contract to sell bad 
because the parties failed to follow tjhe procedure of the Utah Cc 
16-10-74, constitutes reaching to justify a decision. If the Heath 
Development Company's activities were measured by the provisions of 
-13-
-14-
Utah Code Annotated 16-10-74, it would result in voiding practi-
cally all of the actions of this small family corporation for years 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore respectfully submit that this Honorable 
Court failed to consider (1) the past manner of doing business by 
this corporation; (2) the fact that it was a small family organiza-
tion that operated informally, perhaps as a partnership; (3) that 
defendant had ample opportunity to nullify its actions which were 
agreed upon at the meeting of January 13, 1974, but failed to resc: 
the agreement, but instead let plaintiff and respondent complete H 
entire work and only then, on April 8, 1974, almost one month aheac 
of the optional time which it was granted to refinance and complete 
the transaction, did Mrs, Heath, acting only upon the advi#e of an 
outsider, Flinders, did the plaintiff become aware that the transa-
tion would not be completed and that defendant was going to rescin 
(4) after plaintiff had completed all the requirements of the lis 
ing and the earnest money agreements, with full knowledge to defen 
dants of plaintifffs activities, defendant should be estopped from 
rescinding the agreement at this late stage. 
We therefore submit that the only possible reason for her 
refusal to sign the deed was plain "sellers remorse" and no' other 
reason. Although the agreement on and shortly after January 13, J 
may have been voidable, it was certainly not void and defendants 
had a duty to act within a reasonable time to avoid the corporatic 
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being bound under the listing agreement and earnest money con 
tracts. 
We therefore submit that the plaintiff and respondent is 
entitled to have this Honorable Court reconsider its ruling. 
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